Leave it up to liberal policy makers to give too much away in an attempt to be pragmatic and reasonable. This is what happened with the gas deal; a lot was given away, and the policymakers and many of their pundits applauded it as good sense. But sometimes the pragmatism and reasonableness backfires, as it has today. Don’t blame the (phony) opposition—no matter how phony they are—for the (potential) sacking of Yekhanurov’s gov; he and his boss set their government up for a no-confidence vote with a bad deal, which is the second highly questionable (but initially lauded as “reasonable”) deal they’ve struck. How far is this particular wing of the orange movement willing to go in making concessions with the very powers that the OR stood against?
It’s a bad deal; read this, this, and this (all three are from EDM's Vladimir Socor; but he's not the only one out there pointing out the downside to the deal). Why is the YuGov so willing to compromise Ukraine’s ability to cobble together an energy policy that would help make Ukraine more autonomous from Russia, and that would show Ukraine continuing to act as a regional leader via its initiative for a Eurasian energy scheme that thwarts Russia’s attempt to use energy for neo-imperial purposes? The momentum for a more hardline stance was once again squandered.
More tomorrow or the day after. . .
Update: not to say, however, that the vote to dimiss the government of Yekhanurov just ahead of major parliamentary elections and in a time of great uncretainty over constitutional procedures due to polit reform was a good thing. My opinion of Tymoshenko has been gradually changing since she was sacked, and this time her cooperation with the proMoscow or "hardline," as Kuzio likes to put it, opposition seems to betray or confirm that she is more ambitious than she is principled by nature. Is she really doing this on the basis of a principled opposition? And what stance are the socialists and Moroz taking on all of this?